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THE VALUE OF WATER IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
ECONOMY: SOME IMPLICATIONS 
 






The South African Water Research Commission (WRC) initiated a number of research 
projects aimed at determining the value of water in different sectors of the economy 
and in different parts of the country. This research is reviewed. Water values were 
found to differ significantly between sectors, between geographic areas and within 
geographic areas. As agriculture is a large consumer of water several studies along 
different rivers were undertaken, including studies on water quality. Average ratios 
indicate that agriculture is an inefficient user of water in terms of gross income 
generated per unit of water and also in terms of jobs created per unit of water. 
Irrigation farming is, however, an important employer of labour while it contributes 
30% to the value of farm output. A marginal approach and water demand elasticities 
also indicate that non-agriculture generally places a high value on water assurance 
but little value on more than what it already uses. This may indicate that although 
water is expected to transfer out of agriculture in the longer run, in the short run 
agriculture may be its best use. Water efficiency could be significantly enhanced if 
transfers within and between river reaches are promoted, as water shadow prices 
differ. Inputs from the  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) are 
important in water allocation due to socio-economic and environmental externalities 




As South Africa is a drought prone, water poor region it seems probable that 
water shortages will redirect economic development. As water scarcity 
increases, the need to manage water as a national asset and for overall social 
benefit becomes imperative. During the past number of years the South 
African Water Research Commission (WRC) and the Department of Water 
Affairs have initiated a number of economic research projects aimed at 
determining the value of water in different sectors of the economy and in 
different parts of the country. 
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The purpose of this article is to review existing information and experience in 
order to obtain the best current estimate of the value of water in different 
sectors of the South African economy, and to establish the role that water 
plays in regional economies within the country. Knowledge of basic human 
needs, the assurance of supply, and the value of water in different sectors and 
basins can aid in demand management in times of shortages. This information 
is required to optimise scarce water resources for the social benefit of all 
people. In addition to this Command and Control (CAC) procedure, economic 
incentives and institutions can assist in promoting conservation of water 
within the ambit of the law. Economic institutions and incentives have 
internationally promoted conservation and the efficient use of water by using 
knowledge that is decentralised. 
 
2.  THE SOUTH AFRICAN WATER RESOURCE STRATEGY 
 
The National Water Act (No 36 of 1998) specifies that Government, as the 
trustee of the nation’s water resources, must ensure that water is protected, 
used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in an equitable and 
sustainable manner for the benefit of all people. The Act requires that the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) should act as custodian of 
the country’s water resources (RSA, 2002), and guarantees basic human needs 
and ecological use (the reserve) as rights along with international obligations. 
Irrigation and other commercial agricultural activities are excluded from this 
allocation (Louw, 2001:18; RSA, 1998). The New Act thus gives priority to 
basic human needs and ecological sustainability above that of agriculture and 
other industries. The New Act respects pre-existing water rights and farmers 
may continue using water until a call is made for the application of water 
licences. Water licences have a maximum span of 40 years and are subject for 
review at intervals not exceeding five years.  
 
The implementation framework for the National Water Act of 1998 is 
provided for in the National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS). The NWRS 
has four objectives, which include the establishment of the framework for 
catchment management strategies. A catchment management strategy is the 
framework of water resource management in a water management area (RSA, 
2002). 
 
In the preamble to the Act it is clear that water management is to a large 
extent under the control of the state. However, Section 25(1) of the Act makes 
provision for the temporary transfer of water entitlement between users, 
which raises the possibility of complementary actions between government 
and the private sector. The Act also contains other important provisions that 
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will support a water market. First, a distinction is drawn between land and 
water rights. Second, the management of catchments will eventually be 
assigned to Catchment Management Agencies (CMA) and it will be possible 
for CMAs, with the approval of the Minister, to include water markets as an 
allocation strategy within a catchment. 
 
3. ECONOMIC  PRINCIPLES 
 
Water has two main uses: either consumed directly as a consumption good or 
used as a factor of production in agriculture, forestry and industry, etc. The 
economic foundation of the demand for these two consumption uses differs, 
and is discussed separately below. 
 
3.1  Water as a consumption good 
 
Residential demand is the only water use category where water is consumed 
directly. Residential water competes directly with other items in the 
household budget. In this regard, consumer choice can be modelled as utility 
maximisation given a budget constraint, from which a downward sloping 
demand for water can be derived. Some characteristics of water resemble that 
of ‘normal’ economic goods, implying that demand affects the price, while in 
other respects demand is expected to be highly inelastic, reflecting the fact 
that water is an essential good. The Espey et al (1997) survey of 124 estimates 
of price elasticity of demand for residential water supports this view. They 
report a median short-term price elasticity of –0.38 and a long run price 
elasticity of –0.64. This shows that residential water is not price responsive in 
the short run, confirming its status as an essential good.  
 
Apart from the time horizon, price elast i c i t y  i s  a f f e c t e d  b y  t y p e  o f  u s e .  
Evidence from Europe, USA and Africa indicates that households are willing 
to pay much more for drinking water and basic needs than water used to 
irrigate gardens (Foster & Beattie, 1979; Zabel et al, 1998; Rogerson, 1996). 
Veck and Bill (2000) record a similar result for Alberton–Thokoza in South 
Africa where the price elasticity of demand is estimated to be –0.13, for 
indoors and –0.38 for outdoors use. The lower elasticity for indoor use indicates 
that this is less price responsive, and hence more of an essential good.  
 
From an empirical perspective, the total value of water for residential use can 
be quantified by the consumer surplus (area under demand for water but above 
the water price). The marginal value for water (marginal utility), i.e. its scarcity 
value, is reflected by the price of water. A condition for economic efficiency in 




consumption is that marginal utility must be equated for all consumers, which 
is achieved as all consumers in a given area face the same price. 
 
Quantity demanded is a function of willingness-to-pay as well as the ability to 
pay and while poor consumers may be willing to pay an infinite amount for 
basic needs water they may be unable to do so and be excluded from the 
resource (McMaster & MacKay, 1998). Present legislation supports the basic 
needs position and includes a provision of 25 litres of water per person per 
day for drinking, food preparation and personal hygiene.  
 
Several studies in poor communities have, however, indicated that poor 
people are willing to pay for water and that this willingness-to-pay indicates 
the opportunity for efficient allocation through price (Conradie, 2002). An 
extensive study of domestic water demand in low-income communities in the 
northern parts of South Africa has found that demand in squatter camps 
obeys the same rules as demand in formal settlements. As in formal 
settlements, quantity demanded in squatter camps is a function of income, 
price of water, the presence of gardens, awareness of scarcity, time of the day, 
season, number of household members and the number of visitors (Van 
Schalkwyk, 1996). 
 
3.2  Water as a factor of production 
 
Theoretically the demand for irrigation water is a derived input demand, as 
irrigation water is a factor of production. An input demand is derived from 
the demand of the product (profitability of crops, etc), the production function 
(water plant efficiency), and the supply conditions of other factors of 
production (water saving technologies). The total income generated by the 
application of water (total value) can be measured by the integral of the area 
under the input demand function of water. The value of an additional unit of 
water can be expressed by the value of the marginal product. These concepts 
are shown in Figure 1 where DD is the demand for water, Qa the availability 
of water (supply is SS), A+B the total value of water and B = Rent or Residual.  
 
In this situation no cost is shown for water. If costs exist then it will be 
deducted from value. The total per unit value is (A+B)/Q which is an average 
concept, while the rent or residual value per unit is B/Q = Pw (which is a 
marginal concept). In a functioning water market, the price of water rights is 
captured by Pw. These rights can be expressed as rental income (annual 
income) or a capitalised value (capital value of an asset). In a water market the 
price of water rights represents the contribution of water after all costs have 
been deducted, including water charges. The total value (Area A+B) and 
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marginal value (B) provide different information to stakeholders. In a 
Cost/Benefit Analysis the area A+B is compared with the cost of providing 
water (building dams) to ascertain whether benefits exceed costs. The 
marginal value is critical in utilising the resource in an efficient manner. For 
instance reallocation of use will promote societies’ income if water has a 













  Price of 










Figure 1:  Resource demand for water 
 
Whether the total contribution or the marginal contribution is estimated in a 
study depends on the technique used. In a crop budget total cost is deducted 
from total income yielding the total and average contribution of water (Area 
A+B). Programming techniques provide information on the Value of the 
Marginal Product (VMP) of water given by the shadow price of the water, 
which is the marginal value (B/Q). The latter technique can also be used to 
derive the total and average value of water. Production functions provide 
information on the VMP of water although average value can also be derived. 
The Willingness to Pay (WTP) approach estimates average consumer surplus, 
which is an approximation of market values and thus estimates marginal 
value B/Q. If water is rented then the trading price is B/Q or if it is sold then 
the selling price is the capitalised value of area B or B/Q (if expressed per m3).  
 
4.  THE CONTRIBUTION OF WATER TO DIFFERENT SECTORS 
 
In order to decide which sectors should be given preference in water 
allocation during scarcity, information is needed on the value of water in 
these sectors. Various sources of information will be critically evaluated. 
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4.1  The importance of water in supporting income and creating jobs 
 
Agriculture is an inefficient user of water, as it supports the lowest GDP per 
million m3 while it creates the fewest jobs per million m3. One cubic meter of 
water adds R1.5 in agriculture, R157.4 in industry, R39.5 in mining and R44.4 
in eco-tourism (Conningarth Consultants, 2001). Large differences also appear 
in agriculture, with the highest contribution per m3 in livestock and game 
farming followed by orchards and lastly fodder crops. One million m3  of 
water supports 250 jobs in agriculture but 1,785,000 jobs in glass products 
(BKS, 1999). However, these data do not show forward and backward 
linkages between sectors, for instance between agriculture and other sectors. 
Crop failures usually have ripple effects through the economy. 
 
Some comments of caution are raised in interpreting these data, as they are 
average relationships derived from Input/Output tables. In the face of scarcity, 
water use should be allocated between sectors based on marginal benefits and 
not on average benefits. That is, water efficiency for the industry sector is high 
because output is high and water use low. Also, production is based on many 
other factors, and not on water only. It is, however, expected that supply 
assurance for water is high in mining and industry compared to agriculture. 
The input elasticity of demand for water is expected to be low in sectors where 
the cost of water is a relatively small share of the value of the final product and 
where water cannot be replaced by other factors of production (Friedman, 
1962:153). A low price elasticity of demand implies that a high premium is 
placed on sufficient water and a high level of assurance.  
 
The marginal contribution of water in industry is expected to be much lower 
than the R157.4 per million m3 mentioned earlier. Water use by these sectors is 
not rationed in South Africa and they are able to acquire as much water as they 
need at current municipal prices. That is, profit-maximizing firms in industry 
will purchase water from municipalities until the contribution that the last unit 
of water makes to the firm (VMP) is equal to the price of water (about R1.26/m3 
in the case of the Nelson Mandela Metropole). Economic logic thus indicates 
that the marginal contribution of water could be as low as R1.26/m3. Some 
sectors place a higher premium on sufficient water and marginal contributions 
cannot be the only criterion of allocation between sectors.  
 
4.2 The  importance  of  water in job creation 
 
Although agriculture creates few jobs per unit of water compared to other 
sectors, it generates more jobs per value of output than other sectors 
(Conningarth Consultants, 2001). For instance production of R1 million in 
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agriculture creates 24 jobs in total (direct and induced effects), while mining 
creates 10.9 jobs per R1 million and manufacturing 9.0 jobs per R1 million. 
Agriculture also generates more jobs per R1 million investment (8.06) than the 
other sectors. This number has more relevance to irrigation agriculture than 
other branches of agriculture. That is, investment in dryland maize farming is 
constrained by suitable land area while investment in irrigation could create 
more jobs in the fruit and vegetable enterprises (where water rather than land 
is often the main constraint). 
 
Agriculture, however, requires large quantities of water as only 108 jobs are 
created per 1 million m3 of water in agriculture while industry creates 4,269 
jobs. The mining sector creates 150 jobs per 1 million m3, which is almost in 
the same order of magnitude as agriculture. South African agriculture is 
labour intensive, especially the irrigated sectors (fruit and vegetable farming). 
 
In the allocation of water between agriculture and the other sectors it could be 
taken into account that industry can sometimes grow where water is 
abundant while some of the best fruit and vegetable growing areas are 
situated in areas where water is scarce. Some will question this, as industry 
also requires other resources such as labour and infrastructure, which may be 
available where water is scarce. Market forces will encourage industry 
location where resources including water are relatively abundant, thus the 
State should not subsidise certain resources.  
 
5.  THE VALUE OF WATER IN NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTORS 
 
Studies of water use in non-agricultural sectors include: municipal use 
(Conradie, 2002), commercial forestry (Tewari, 2003), environmental use 
(Hosking et al, 2002) and alien vegetation use (Hosking et al, 2002). 
 
5.1  Municipal water value 
 
Conradie (2002) estimated demand functions for water for household, 
commercial and industrial consumption in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality. Conradie (2002) estimates the marginal benefit of water to 
consumers at R2.40 /m3, which is equivalent to an annual rental value of 
R21,600/ha for a 9,000 m3 allocation. Bulk sales of treated water to lesser 
municipalities are priced at R1.26/m3. The city purchases water from the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry at an annual rate of R0.256/m3. 
There is no doubt that, like irrigation, municipalities capture the residual 
value of the resource, but the reserve price at which agriculture will start 
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losing water to municipal use in that area is R1.26/m3 minus treatment costs 
in 1999 terms.  
 
In order to increase income variability of households in the data set, observations 
from the more affluent residential areas and townships (low income consumers) 
were pooled. Using a regression model, the water price elasticity was estimated 
at –0.47 (t = -3.10) which is low and indicates that this use is not sensitive to price 
increases. A similar estimate (-0.40) was reported for Australia (Australian 
Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 1999).  
 
5.2 Commercial  forestry 
 
Water is the most important limiting factor of production in commercial 
forestry in South Africa. Commercial forestry uses water in two forms: 
evapotranspiration (ET) and stream flow reduction (SFR). In terms of stream 
flow reduction water use is estimated to be in the region of 1.4 billion m3 per 
annum or roughly 8 & of the total utilisable water in South Africa. Since 
commercial afforestation has been declared as a stream flow reduction activity 
(SFRA), it is to be regulated by means of a SFRA Water Use Licensing System 
in terms of Chapter 4, Section 36 of the National Water Act (No 36 of 1998).  
 
The value of the two uses of water (ET and SFR) in forestry was further 
estimated using two methods, namely the Residual Value (RV) method and 
the Marginal Value Product (MVP) method. The residual value method is 
based on the premise that the residual value obtained as total revenue minus 
total cost, including compensation for capital and management, is attributed 
to water. The marginal value product method is based on the assumption that 
water is rewarded according to its MVP .  B o t h  a p p r o a c h e s  w e r e  u s e d  t o  
estimate water values in selected sites of eucalyptus and pine in the eastern 
seaboard of South Africa. These two species were selected as they dominate 
South African forestry, especially on the east coast. Results of the estimates of 
water values are presented in Table 1. It is shown that water values estimated 
vary depending on method of estimation and type of use. 
 
ET values estimated by the RV method for eucalyptus vary from 4c to 13c per 
m3 of water, with the former found in low rainfall areas such as Baynesfield 
and the latter in a high rainfall area such as Kwambonambi. The average 
value comes to 8c per m3. The ET value for pine, estimated by the RV method, 
averages at 1.7c per m3. Water value estimates for pine species are much lower 
than for eucalyptus. The difference can be explained in terms of the growth 
pattern of the two tree species; eucalyptus grows faster and uses water more 
efficiently. 
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Table 1:  A comparison of types of annual water values in commercial forestry 
Name of Sites 
ET value by RV 
Method 
R/m3/year 
ET value by MVP 
Method 
R/m3/year 




  Kia-Ora 
  Tanhurst 
  Kwambonambi 
















Average 0.08  0.31  3.42 
Pine 
  Richmond 
  Greytown 













Average 0.017  0.15  1.79 
Source: Tewari, 2003 
 
The ET value estimates by the MVP method vary between 4 to 60c per m3 of 
water and are roughly 4 times the estimates by the RV method. The RV 
method measures the residual net value attributed to water after paying for all 
other inputs in the production process. As the MVP of water was derived 
from production functions (Table 1), it measures the value before other costs 
have been deducted. In the other studies reported in this paper the MVP was 
estimated from programming techniques after other costs have been 
deducted. The MVP estimates in Table 1 will thus be ignored in the further 
discussion in this paper.  
 
This argument also applies to SFR values of water estimated by the MVP 
method. These values, nevertheless, need mentioning. SFR values vary from 
R1.90 to R4.44 per m3, roughly 40 times the ET values estimated by the RV 
method. According to Tewari (2003:56) runoff on natural vegetation is 20% 
and in a plantation 10%. This implies that the value of water in terms of SFR 
value is about 10 times the value in terms of ET. It is concluded that the value 
of water in commercial forestry is greater than its average ET value, estimated 
in Table 1. If the uncertainty of this estimate is accepted then a figure of 8c per 
m3 is suggested.  
 
5.3  The environmental use of water 
 
Hosking  et al (2002) estimated the value of freshwater inflows in the 
Keurboom Estuary using the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). The 
method entailed asking respondents how much they were willing to pay 
(WTP) to prevent the loss of environmental services provided by the estuary 
d u e  t o  r e d u c e  f r e s h w a t e r  i n f l o w s ,  g i v e n  t h a t  r e d u c e d  i n f l o w  f r o m  t h e  
  170Agrekon, Vol 43, No 2 (June 2004)  Nieuwoudt, Backeberg & Du Plessis 
 
 
Tsitsikamma Catchment could lead to closure of the estuary mouth, where 
inflows have already been reduced by infestation of water-consuming alien 
vegetation. The removal of this vegetation was initiated under the Working 
for Water (WfW) programme. In the WTP study the target population was 
identified as users of the estuary who included anglers, baiters, swimmers, 
birdwatchers, bathers and those who benefited from water frontage/access 
and the scenic value. 
 
The willingness to pay to prevent the negative consequences of cutting off 
freshwater inflow was estimated at R274 per user (Standard deviation R262), 
based on a sample of 150 respondents. The total recreational value of water 
was estimated at R3,626,128 or 4.6c/m3/annum (Hosking et al, 2002), 
substantially less than the willingness to pay for water for farming of 
12.5c/m3. According to the researchers the benefits derived by those above the 
estuary were not included. Other benefits such as fire damage reduction and 
preservation of biodiversity were also not included. In this study the 
environmental value of water was estimated at about 5c/m3/annum. It can be 
expected that this value will vary significantly between areas. 
  
6.  THE VALUE OF WATER IN AGRICULTURE 
 
In Table 2, the irrigated area in agriculture and the direct contribution of 
water to agricultural income are shown for different agricultural enterprises. 
Irrigation water is essential to South Africa’s fruit industry, which ranks 
amongst the most important export commodities. The value of commercial 
crop production under irrigation is estimated at R14,700 million annually 
according to Table 2. This figure excludes enterprises such as wine grapes for 
which area under irrigation was not available. It is thus estimated that 30% of 
the value of South African agriculture is produced under irrigation, similar to 
the contribution of water to rural value added in Australia, which was also 
30% (Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 1999).  
 
Since agriculture is the most important consumer of water (54% of total use), 
studies in the following regions were undertaken; Fish-Sundays Scheme in 
Eastern Cape (Conradie, 2002), Berg River (Louw, 2001), Crocodile River 
Catchment (Bate et al, 1999), Lower Orange River (Armitage, 1999) and 
Eastern and Southern Cape (Hosking et al, 2002). 
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Table 2:  The contribution of irrigation to commercial crop production, 2000/01 
Area irrigated  Production 
Crop 
‘000 ha 
% of total area 
planted to crop  Rm 
% of national 
production 
Maize 110  3  626  10 
Wheat 170  12  739  30 
Other small grains  52  3  16  6 
Potatoes 39  70  1373  80 
Vegetables 108  66  2296  90 
Table Grapes  103  90  1504  90 
Citrus 35  85  1462  90 
Other fruit  95  80  4148  90 
Oilseeds 54  10  199  15 
Sugarcane 60  15  779  25 
Cotton (Lint)  18  17  92  42 
Tobacco 12  85  559  90 
Lucerne 203  70  657  80 
Other pastures & forages  104  15  250  25 
Total     14700   
Source: Backeberg & Odendaal, 1998 and RSA, 2002 
 
6.1  Existing farming area  
 
In this section the contribution of water is captured by its marginal 
contribution to net income (VMP).  
 
6.1.1  Fish-Sundays River Scheme  
 
The Fish-Sundays River is supplied by an inter-basin transfer of 560 million 
m3/year water from the Gariep Dam on the Orange River. During the past 
five years the Orange River delivered between 65 and 95% of the water used 
in the Fish-Sundays Scheme. 
 
Conradie (2002) constructed linear programming models for 16 model types 
of farm situations in this area, also allowing for risk using MOTAD. In models 
where risk was ignored, the model simulated more specialisation in crops 
than what is actually occurring. Inclusion of risk has lead to more 
diversification and a more realistic model. Estimates of the value of water 
were sensitive to assumed risk aversion values, indicating that the degree of 
confidence that can be placed on estimates is not very high.  
 
Estimates of the value of water also differ significantly amongst the different 
representative farms (Table 3). This is expected if the transaction cost of water 
transfers is high. Table 3 shows that three farm types attach a zero marginal 
value to water. For the remainder, marginal willingness to pay for water 
ranges between R0.0003/m3 and R0.2115/m3. Municipal bulk rates for the 
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area are R0.256/m3. The current allocation of water is not efficient due to wide 
differences between areas. Table 3 also lists the purchase price of a cubic 
meter and a hectare’s worth of water across farm types. 
 
Table 3:  Marginal water values for the Fish-Sundays at current allocation  
Water rental  Purchase price 
Representative farm 
R/m3 R/ha R/m3 R/ha 
Type 1 Upper Fish irrigation  0.0011  15  0.02  297 
Type 2 Upper Fish stock farm  0.0067  90  0.13  1809 
Type 3 Upper Fish farm business  0.0106  143  0.21  2862 
Type 4 Upper Fish dairy farm  0.0412  556  0.82  11124 
Type 5 Middle Fish irrigation  0.0003  4  0.01   81 
Type 6 Middle Fish stock farm  -  -  -  - 
Type 7 Middle Fish farm business  0.0120  162  0.24  3240 
Type 8 Middle Fish dairy farm  0.0427  576  0.85  11529 
Type 9 Lower Fish irrigation  -  -  -  - 
Type 10 Lower Fish stock farm  0.0014  18  0.03  350 
Type 11 Lower Fish farm business  0.0163  204  0.33  4075 
Type 12 Lower Fish dairy farm  0.0378  473  0.76  9450 
Type 13 Sundays Small mixed  0.1702  1532  3.40  30636 
Type 14 Large stable citrus  0.2115  1904  4.23  38070 
Type 15 Small expanding citrus  0.0815  734  1.63  14670 
Type 16 Large expanding citrus  -  -  -  - 
Source: Conradie (2002:148) 
 
Table 3 indicates that citrus producers as a group are able to bid water away 
from fodder producers, while water will migrate from the Fish to the Sundays 
River. As some resource areas have zero opportunity cost of water, it is 
estimated that 77 million m3/year or 13% of the resource can be redistributed 
away from irrigation at zero opportunity cost. Two thirds of the current 
allocation can be bid away at a price of R0.035/m3. Thus equity objectives can 
be satisfied at zero or very low opportunity cost to commercial irrigation. 
Conradie (2002) concludes that the Fish-Sundays may be a possible source of 
cheap water that should be further investigated. 
 
The total water value for the scheme is estimated to be R27 million in 1999 
Rand while irrigation shadow prices range from zero to 21c/m3. The value of 
water in the small scale farming area (Tyefu) was also estimated. If the water 
tariff is included as a cost then the value is estimated as negative in this scheme. 
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6.1.2  Berg River Basin 
 
Louw (2001) developed a positive mathematical programming model to study 
the impact of water markets in the Berg River Basin. The novelty of the 
technique is that it is calibrated to simulate the base period, which avoids the 
introduction of inflexible bounds. Louw (2001) showed that the capitalised 
marginal value of water differs from as low as R0.0/m3 to as high as R20.0/m3 
within sub-sectors of the river basin. The median capitalised market value of 
water is estimated at R1.6/m3 (rental rate of R0.21/m3) if no trade is assumed 
and R0.30/m3 if trade is assumed. Louw (2001) used a capitalization rate of 
13%, which appears high. The median capitalised water right is estimated in 
the base analysis at R8,000 per ha (5,000 m3 per ha * R1.60/m3) for a water 
right of 5,000 m3. The observed water rights in the Upper Berg ranged from 
R4,000 to R6,000 per ha, which were lower than recorded in 2000. The 
significant differences in the value of water between areas within the basin 
indicate that significant gains are possible from trade between these areas. 
 
6.2 New  irrigation 
 
6.2.1  Crocodile River Catchment  
 
Bate  et al (1999) studied the trading of water in the basin and observed a 
capitalised value of water between 18.75c/m3 and 22.75/m3 (Table 4). A wide 
range of trade prices (rental value) for water was observed, ranging from zero 
to 6c/m3 with a modal of 2.5c/m3. There were only a handful of buyers (four 
accounted for 90% of trade volume) but 45 sellers. Twenty-three permanent 
trades and 46 temporary trades occurred. Bate et al (1999) concluded that the 
high variation in trade prices could be attributed to asymmetric information 
between large buyers and many small sellers, with a large buyer paying 
different small sellers different prices, including a zero price. A zero price 
trade does not imply zero value as the buyer must pay the water rates, which 
are as high as 0.84c/m3. Most of the trades (97% by volume) are from farmers 
in the upper/middle Crocodile River selling to farmers in the lower Crocodile 
River. This is important as trades from up to down river increase stream flow 
and is desirable for the environment. 
 
The highest value of water was estimated in tropical fruits and the lowest in 
sugar cane. Sugar cane production, however, increased in spite of relatively 
lower returns per ha of land. This was attributed to the fact that the industry 
was more stable, with fixed domestic sugar cane prices. According to Bate et al 
(1999) water traded on short-term leases is likely to be used on this crop as it 
is a shorter-term crop and production can be changed more quickly. 
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Table 4:  Water trades in Crocodile River Catchment  
General Trade Information  Permanent  Temporary 
Number of trades 
Number of zero price trades 
Area traded (ha) 
Volume of water traded (million m3) 
Trade price (capital value) of water c/m3) 













Note:  * = Non-zero trade price 
Source:  Bate et al (1999) 
 
Bate  et al (1999) estimated gains from trade at R12.8 million annually. A 
negative externality of trade is that river flow may be reduced, causing 
increased concentration of industrial sewage and farming effluent. However, 
several farmers only sought extra water as assurance against drought, so not 
all supplies will have been used. Bate et al (1999) estimated that out of 12 
million m3 water traded, 8 million m3 is actually used. As is the case in other 
areas, the cost farmers pay for water is substantially less than what urban 
consumers pay. The full economic cost (excluding financing) of providing 
water from the Kwena dam is 46c/m3, while farmers pay 0.7c/m3 and urban 
consumers R1/m3. The latter users and taxpayers clearly subsidise agriculture. 
 
6.2.2  Lower Orange River 
 
According to Moller (2003), a prominent farmer between Kakamas and 
Keimoes, water rights during February 2003 sold for between R8,000 and 
R10,000 per ha (15,000m3) with an average of 60c/m3. All the water trades 
were of a permanent nature. No renting of water takes place, as farmers need 
security of use for their long run investment in table and wine grapes. 
According to Engelbrecht (as reported by Hosking et al (2002)) water rights in 
the Sundays River trade for about R2,000 per ha (quota is 9,000m3) or 
22.2c/m3. The market price of water is about a third in the Sundays River 
compared to the Orange (22.2c/m3 compared to 60c/m 3) and water would 
move from the Fish/Sundays to the lower Orange if transfers were permitted. 
Moller (2003) further estimates that water would probably rent for about R450 
per ha or 3cm3/m (the rent of R450 per ha on an investment of R9,000 per ha 
represents a return or discount rate of 5%). He further indicated that farmers 
could rely on the reliability of the river flow. Because of the latter, farmers 
have stopped planting low value crops which they could use as a water 
reserve in times of drought.  
 
Moller (2003) also states that selling prices of water are responsive to 
economic conditions (price of the product etc). Water prices in this area have 
more than doubled since the Armitage (1999) study. Armitage (1999) reported 
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an average price (asset value) for water trades in the Lower Orange of R3,407 
per ha or 22.7c/m3. The average water price varies from as little as R800/ha to 
as high as R5,000/ha. Closer examination of the data shows that there were 
fewer buyers (9) and more sellers (21), where the number of contracts per 
buyer varied from one to 14, while contracts per seller varied from one to two. 
Purchase prices vary significantly, indicating that there may be asymmetric 
information (buyers are better informed about prices than sellers). The same 
phenomenon is observed by Bate et al (1999) for the Crocodile River 
Catchment. It appears as if this range has narrowed if Moller’s (2003) prices 
are compared with Armitage (1999). This is expected to happen if farmers 
have better information. 
 
A discriminant analysis undertaken between buyers and sellers of water 
rights showed that the most important variable discriminating between the 
two groups was that buyers were table grape farmers (F = 18.3) and secondly 
that buyers had a higher return per unit of water (F = 14.9). This shows that 
the water-market in the Lower Orange promotes the efficiency of water use. 
  
6.3  The value of water in the Eastern and Southern Cape 
 
Water values were estimated in order to arrive at benefits from removing 
water-consuming alien vegetation. This study was undertaken under the 
Working for Water (WfW) programme, the biggest conservation project in 
terms of manpower use currently being undertaken in South Africa. Over 250 
projects have been implemented since its inception in 1995 and during 1998, 
about 40,000 jobs were created (Hosking et al, 2002). In this study the 
conservation value of water was approximated by its agricultural and urban 
use value (best alternative use value), as reflected in Table 5. The runoff from 
the Tsitsikamma Mountain Catchment that does not flow into the sea is used 
for irrigation farming and livestock watering. 
 
Table 5:  Values of water for WfH projects in the Eastern and Southern Cape 
(2000)1 
Site  Value of water (c/m3) Valuation  Method 
Tsitsikamma 12.5  Willingness  to  pay 
Port Elizabeth Driftsands   0.0  Potential user response 
Albany   0.0  User  response 
Kat River  15.7  Willingness to pay 
Pott River  0.0  Non-scarce resource 
Note:  1 = Agricultural willingness to pay 
Source:  Hosking et al (2002) 
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The actual user charge on this water is 5.3c/m3,  which is an annual cost. 
According to Hosking et al (2002) this represents the true cost of supplying the 
water. The rental value of agricultural water according to Willingness to Pay 
amounted to 12.5c/m3 excluding storage and transfer cost (Table 5).  
 
In the following areas water values were zero: Port Elizabeth Driftsands (no 
potential for municipal supply), Albany (high salinity content) and Pott River 
(not used for recreation). In the Kat River farmers were willing to pay 
15.7c/m3 for water. Hosking et al (2002) concluded that the cost of clearing 
alien vegetation on these sites would exceed the benefit if non-metropolitan 
use is considered. 
 
7.  THE VALUE ATTACHED TO ASSURANCE OF SUPPLY OF WATER, 
WATER QUALITY AND TOLERANCE TO RISK  
 
7.1  Assurance to supply and tolerance to risk  
 
In the USA the urban sector attaches a high value to assurance of water 
supply. In Western USA, cities such as Denver buy senior water rights (with a 
high certainty of supply) from farmers and then rent the surplus water back to 
farmers at low prices. The low estimates of the price elasticity of demand for 
urban water support this phenomenon that urban users attach a high value to 
assurance and a low value to additional water. Mirrilees et al (1994:21) also 
state that urban users require a high level of assurance. Conradie (2002) 
estimates the price elasticity of demand for household, commercial and 
industrial consumption as -0.47 (t = -3.10) in the Nelson Mandela Metropole. 
A low (numerically less than 1.0) price elasticity means that the marginal 
benefit of water increases steeply with scarcity but falls quickly with increased 
supply. As urban water in South Africa is purchased from municipalities one 
can approximate the marginal value of urban water by the prices paid to the 
municipalities (R1 to R2/m3).  
 
The linear programming models reported in this article generally estimate 
fairly elastic input demands for agricultural water (Conradie, 2002; Louw, 
2001). These estimates will vary from area to area and from crop to crop but it 
may be possible in agriculture to use water saving technologies or switch to 
more water efficient crops. The fact that agriculture is also a more water 
intensive user than industry indicates a higher elasticity of input demand for 
agriculture (Friedman, 1962). 
 
In agriculture high assurance of supply is needed where capital value 
invested in orchards and vineyards is high and crops are of a long-term 
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nature. Table grape farmers along the Lower Orange do not rent water 
because the investment in table grapes is high (R250,000 per ha) and more 
assurance is required. More renting of water takes place in Australia in areas 
where annual crops are grown (Australian Academy of Technological 
Sciences and Engineering, 1999). Water marketing can promote assurance. In a 
study in the Crocodile River, the most important reason buyers of water rights 
have given is that they require a steady flow, as they are concerned about 
drought (Bate et al, 1999). 
 
The water law that operates in South Africa and Australia (derived from 
riparian principles) does not provide farmers as much security of water use as 
in the case of prior appropriation water law operating in the Western USA. 
Under prior appropriation, requirements of senior water right holders must 
first be satisfied before more junior water right holders. Under riparian 
principles the apportionment of all irrigators is reduced by the same fraction 
when water flow decreases. 
 
To overcome the lack of assurance in water rights, South African farmers 
typically retain surplus water rights for drought years in the Lower Orange 
River where capital investment in table grapes is high. South African farmers 
m a y  n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  d o  t h i s  i n  f u t u r e  if non-use rights (sleepers) are lost. 
Another practice is to include a low-income crop such as lucerne in their 
production portfolio. In a drought year, water can be diverted from this crop 
at relatively low cost. If South African farmers lose sleeper rights then they 
can fall back on the second option. According to a prominent farmer (Moller, 
2003) in this river reach (Lower Orange), the flow in this river has been fairly 
stable in recent years (due to dams) and these practices are not so common at 
present. 
 
7.2 Water  quality 
 
Water quality is a major concern in certain areas and sectors in South Africa. 
For instance in the Eastern Cape, the Fish River is frequently flushed as the 
return flow is not suitable for irrigation.  
 
7.2.1  Salinity in the Middle Vaal River area 
 
The direct and indirect costs of salination in the Middle Vaal River area were 
estimated by Urban Econ (2000), using an Input-Output technique. As the 
average salinity level experienced in the area is 500 mg/l TDS, a reduction 
below this is a cost saving while an increase above this level leads to an 
increase in cost. It is estimated that direct costs of R80.5 million will be saved 
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if present levels drop to 200 mg/l TDS. Increasing salinity to 1,200 mg/l TDS 
will increase salinity cost to R183 million. These cost data are not 
representative of other sectors of the South African economy, as high urban, 
mining and industrial concentration occurs in this area. The data, however, 
show that salinity is a major cost to urban water users, especially the 
household sector. 
 
7.2.2  Sulphate pollution in the Witbank Catchment  
 
South Africa has previously regulated pollution through Command and 
Control (CAC) methods whereby industries are prescribed the technology or 
processes that must be used. While this approach may have merit, a more cost 
efficient way is to provide polluters with an incentive to reduce pollution. 
Since 1994 South Africa’s legal and policy framework has evolved so that it is 
more suitable to economic approaches such as the Polluter Pays Principle 
(Taviv et al, 1999). 
 
Taviv et al (1999) studied sulphate pollution in the Witbank Catchment and 
estimated that within a year revenue of between R3 million and R9 million 
could be raised from pollution charges, which was less than the estimated cost 
of pollution. They estimate that full cost recovery can be achieved within four 
years. A main concern in South Africa is employment, and to mitigate the loss 
of jobs if pollution is taxed it is recommended that firms should be given 
incentives to reduce cost in such a way that jobs are not sacrificed (Taviv et al, 
1999). 
 
Another study on sulphate pollution in the Olifants River near Witbank was 
undertaken by Economic Project Evaluation (1998). The latter researchers 
differed in their approach to the pollution problem in the catchment. They 
alleged that this type of pollution is a non-point source (not easily monitored 
and measured). Market based research tools have proved to be effective in 
dealing with point source pollution, as it is easily monitored and measured, 
but less effective in dealing with non-point pollution. In the latter study 
(Economic Project Evaluation, 1998), a marginal cost model was used to 
simulate green taxes and a simulation model to simulate tradable permits. 
Permits were traded within a geographic area also referred to as a bubble. The 
trading partners were five coalmines who are responsible for the sulphate 
pollution. The market price of permits for the two approaches (marginal cost 
and simulation) for a given level of pollution abatement was similar. 
 
Taxes and tradable pollution rights have different impacts on polluters. Taxes 
can have a detrimental effect on profits and employment in some industries, 
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especially where the price of the product is set internationally. In the latter 
case the tax cannot be partially shifted. Tradable permits also have welfare 
implications, as those polluters who can modify their plant and equipment 
and sell permits are affected differently from those who cannot and must 
purchase permits. The modelling exercise demonstrated economic efficiency 
of economic measures and it was recommended that a pilot study using 





Input/output and multiplier analyses indicate that South African agriculture 
is an inefficient user of water in term of gross income generated per unit of 
water and also in terms of jobs created per unit of water. South African 
agriculture is, however, an important employer of labour as it is labour 
intensive especially in the fruit and vegetable growing sectors. Evidence is 
provided that indicates that non-agriculture generally places a high value on 
sufficient water but little value on more than what it already uses. From this it 
is concluded that water may have to be transferred in future from agriculture 
to non-agriculture, but not at present (although providing water for 
disadvantaged groups will always be a top priority in South Africa). With an 
urban demand elasticity for water of about -.40, municipalities can only sell 
4% more water in urban areas if they reduce the price by 10%. This means that 
the income of municipalities from water sales will fall drastically if they try to 
sell more water through lower prices. They may be reluctant to do that and 
the suspicion is that municipalities as monopoly suppliers of water use price 
discrimination to increase revenues. 
 
Water values differ significantly between sectors, between geographic areas 
and within geographic areas. The following estimates of the rental value 
(annual value) of water were reported; existing irrigation: Berg River 
(21c/m3), Fish/Sundays River (0.0c/m3 to 21c/m3); new irrigation: Lower 
Orange (3c/m3), Crocodile River (2.5c/m3), Eastern and Southern Cape 
(12.5c/m3); Forestry (8c/m3); Environment (5c/m3) and Urban (74c/m3 and 
R2.40/m3). 
 
The problem of comparing water values between these geographic regions is 
that different measurement tools were used. The tools used are more 
appropriate to study water values for different resource areas within a given 
study area. For instance market trading indicates the capital value of water as 
60c/m3 in the Lower Orange (Moller, 2003) and 22c/m3 in the Sundays/Fish 
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River (Hosking et al, 2002), which indicates that water has a higher use in the 
former area. 
  
A partnership between Government and the private initiative can further 
promote water use efficiency. Water efficiency could be enhanced 
significantly if water transfers within river reaches are promoted. Water 
transfers should not only be permitted, but institutions need to be created that 
promote transfers (within the ambit of the Water Act). Institutions will also 
reduce the transaction cost of transfers. Socio-economic aspects and the 
impact of transfers on the environment need to be considered. The transfer of 
water values between major rivers such as the Orange, Vaal and 
Sundays/Fish River could promote water efficiency, while the external 
impacts of such transfers requires further study. In the latter instance water 
may move out of areas with poor soils (high salinity) to areas with good soils 
and high-income crops. It is also possible that communities will be adversely 
affected, thus information is required on the maximum volume of water that 
may be transferred without having a material impact on the community at 
source. Conradie (2002) indicates that some surplus water may be available in 
the Sundays/Fish River. This may imply that less water needs to be diverted 
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